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1. Introduction
I enjoyed reading this paper, if anything because it seems to talk about me and so
many of my friends back in Italy! Leaving aside jokes, the topic is actually quite a serious
one. Billari and Tabellini show that “lateness” may have important effects on people’s
economic success (as measured by earnings, for instance), and even on more macro
variables (such as growth). The evidence in the latter case is circumstantial, and so I
won’t spend time discussing it.
The paper is part of a vast research agenda looking at the impact of demographic
features on economic outcomes. For various examples, see Alesina and Giuliano (2007).
The starting point of the paper is the observation that Italians exhibit “unusual”
demographic features: They complete their education later than their counterparts in other
industrialized countries, they enter the job market later, they leave parental home later,
and they marry and have children later (if at all). Interestingly, they even die later! Life
expectancy at birth for males is 78 in Italy, 77 in UK and France, 76 in Germany, and 75
in the US.
1 In human capital models a longer life horizon may change the incentives to
invest in education, and this may have important consequences for growth, etc.
In a nutshell, the paper considers the impact of “late transition into adulthood” on
income. It focuses on a sample of Italian males born in 1966-1970 surveyed in 2003-04. I
should note that the sample is rather small, only about 500 observations. This is partially
compensated by the richness of the data set, which includes a 5-interval measure of
earnings, age of home leaving, age of first sex, exact date of birth, education, parents’
education/occupation/marital status, etc. Billari and Tabellini regress the measure of
earnings they have on “age of home leaving” and a number of other covariates, and
interpret the effect of “age of home leaving” causally – using an Instrumental Variables
(IV) interpretation.
Before commenting on the paper, it may be of some interest to quantify the extent
and dynamics of the phenomenon. I used the 1986 and 2006 Survey of Household
Income and Wealth (a representative survey of the Italian population conducted every
other year by the Bank of Italy) to compute the proportion of males in various age groups
who live with their parents (in the survey they are classified as “sons” of the head of the
household). Figure 1 shows that between 1986 and 2006 the proportion of individuals
living with their parent has increased for all ages. For example, in 1986 only 33% of 30-
years-old lived with their parents; in 2006, 61% did.
1 The country with the longest life expectancy (80 years) is San Marino, admittedly a de facto Italian
colony. More seriously, this reflects some heterogeneity in life expectancy between Northern and Southern
Italy.2
Figure 1: Proportions of males living with parents
2. The Story and the Findings
The paper’s main claim is that individuals who become “adult” later suffer a
number of disadvantages relative to those who do not. In particular, they have less
incentive to work, less motivation, they are less independent-minded, and less ability to
learn. According to Billari and Tabellini, the economic consequences of such late
transition into adulthood could be substantial. The OLS estimates say that leaving home
one year earlier would increase income by about as much as five additional months of
education. The IV estimate is much larger, suggesting that leaving home one year earlier
would increase income by about as much as 1.5 additional years of education. This is
quite a large effect. Public policies to push people out of parental home would be more
effective than keeping the same people in school, as far as measures of economic success
are concerned.
As an aside, the paper finds that people born in the first quarter of the year earn
way less than people born in other quarters. To put things in perspective, a 3-year
University degree has the same return of not being born in the first quarter. One possible
explanation is that people born in the first quarter are those most likely to be drafted for
compulsory military service.
2 Military service involves loss of 1 (or more) years of
civilian labor market experience, not to mention psychic costs, and so the first quarter of
birth variable may be possibly picking up some of these adverse effects.
3. Validity of Instruments
Billari and Tabellini use two instruments (age of first sex and housing availability
at age 16) to correct for the endogeneity of the “age of home leaving” variable. In this
section I play the role of the devil’s advocate and discuss reasons why one should doubt
2 Military service in Italy is no longer compulsory, but it was for people born in 1966-1970, the cohort used
in the paper.
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the validity of their instruments. Since an exclusion restriction is untestable, a reader will
have to weight appropriately defense and criticism of instruments.
The authors correctly argue that “age of first sex” is a suspicious instrument. As
suggested (and showed) by Hamermesh and Biddle (1994), beauty can enter the earnings
equation; at the same time, beauty may be correlated with age of first sex – beautiful
people do it earlier. I can add two further arguments. First, smarter individuals may leave
home earlier and may also sexually emancipate earlier (or vice versa, i.e., in the case of
“nerds”). Second, there is the possibility of correlated measurement error – especially if
leaving home is a “milestone” event.
Speaking of measurement error, I should note at this point that measurement error
in “age of home leaving” seems to be rather large. Take the simple model in which age of
home leaving, measured with error, is the only covariate:
Here y is earnings, x is “true” age of home leaving, x* is its measured counterpart,
e the measurement error (so that x*=x+e), a is unobserved ability and v a random
disturbance. It’s easy to prove that the OLS bias is partly measurement error bias and
partly ability bias, i.e.
Using the OLS and IV estimates it’s easy to show that (after some manipulation) that
and hence the noise-to-signal ratio must be quite high (73% or more) to be consistent
with the estimates reported in the paper. This casts some doubts on the extent of accuracy
of the data (which are primarily of the “recall” type).
Billari and Tabellini seem to put more faith in their second instrument (housing
supply). But could this also be an invalid instrument? A possible argument is as follows.
Assume that people leave parental home only when they find an acceptable job and
suitable housing. This means that there is a trade-off between the offered wage and the
cost of housing (individuals may accept a low-paid job if they find cheap housing; or may
be willing to pay more for housing if they are offered a high wage). Hence marginal
individuals who face lower cost of housing accept lower offered wages. But in the data
wages are very persistent, hence the housing market conditions when entering the labor
market (and leaving parental home) may still be correlated with wages today, which
invalidates the instruments.
As a parallel argument, I should note that housing market reforms have not reduced
the stock of stay-at-home children, which would suggest that the instrument has little
power. Consider the case of the Equo canone (rent control) legislation. Introduced in
1978, it regulated criteria for establishing rent levels, yearly increases, the duration of
contracts, and repossession procedures. It ended up protecting the “insider” and restricted
severely the supply of rental units. Rent controls were finally abolished in 1992. Yet, as
Figure 1 shows, the proportion of youth living with their parents has increased, not
declined. The paper uses cross-sectional variability rather than the time-series variability
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I am describing here, which may have more to do with provincial differences in wages,
rather than heterogeneity in the supply of housing.
Are there any remedies to possible failure of instrument validity? The ideal way to
get at the “causal” effect would be to neutralize the effect of (permanent) unobserved
ability. Here panel data is of little help, because leaving parental home is an irreversible
decision. One could think however of using within family variability, i.e., twins or
siblings experience. While there are no data of this kind for Italy (as far as I know), in the
US, the PSID tracks individuals after they have left home and formed their own
household. This could allow identifying siblings leaving home at different ages.
4. Causality and All That
Perhaps a more fundamental issue is to establish whether “age of home leaving”
is truly causally (rather than spuriously) affecting earnings. Billari and Tabellini cite three
different reasons why a true causal effect may be expected. First, youths who don’t live
with parents are pushed to work more, and this affect their career profile. Second, they
are younger and hence have a higher ability to learn on the job. Third, they are more
independent-minded, and this may affect their productivity (a “taste heterogeneity”
explanation).
Note that the first two reasons cited point to an “indirect” mechanism (through
labor market experience), rather than a direct one. This means that if one had a reliable
measure of full-time labor market experience, “age of home leaving” would be redundant
(and hence, not causal). Puzzlingly enough, the variable that is best associated with labor
market experience (age of first job) explains nothing, perhaps because, as Billari and
Tabellini note, “this variable refers to menial or temporary jobs that do not correspond to
a milestone event in the transition to adulthood.”
What the paper leaves a bit hanging is a convincing discussion of the
mechanism(s) that is behind the effect of “age of home leaving” on earnings. A possible
story is as follows. Take two equally smart individuals (so that ability differences are
neutralized) – and assume that for exogenous reasons one is living at home with his
parents, and the other on his own. Why would these two individual be differently
productive on the job? For individuals living with their parents, the cost of consumed
goods is lower (they get public goods for free – rent, electricity, etc.). They also spend
less time in non-work, non-leisure activities (laundry, ironing, cooking, etc.). Hence
(most of) their consumption of goods and time is effectively insured and a moral hazard
problem arises – they may put less effort on their job, and hence get lower wages.
Individuals who have left parental home cannot afford this, particularly if the decision to
leave parental home is irreversible.
5. Conclusions
I want to conclude with two observations, one on the possible benefits of
“lateness” and another on the policy implications of the analysis.
The paper is all focused on stressing the costs of being late. But what about the
benefits? A broader welfare analysis would consider also the benefits of leaving home
later, such as increased leisure, economies of scale, etc. Staying with the parents may
signals that children care about their parents. Parents could reciprocate later in life (after
kids have left) by supplying a variety of goods and services: Insurance (i.e., help if5
income shocks strike and insurance markets are absent), liquidity (i.e., informal credit if
financial markets are imperfect), and time (i.e., child care that would be too expensive to
buy on the market). This means that the income loss due to a late transition into
adulthood could be partially balanced by informal insurance, liquidity, time. In other
words, the extra years spent with parents may be a form of investment. Young Italians
may well be utility maximizers given the constraints faced.
The paper provides a number of policy recommendations, such as shortening the
duration of college degree, discouraging students from over-staying in college, reducing
the cost of housing, increasing its supply, and introducing policies aimed at easing young
people’s entry in the labor market. But knowing the mechanism behind the “causal”
effect of “leaving home later” on earnings is key for any policy recommendation to be
effective. Suppose individuals stay with their parents because that’s the only way to get
help to buy a house, or because they need to save in anticipation of that event (Loan-to-
value ratios in Italy were around 50% before recent financial market liberalization). Then,
what would change the incentives to leave are credit market reforms, rather than housing
(or labor) market reforms.
To sum up, I applaud Billari and Tabellini for writing this extremely interesting
paper on “lateness” and measures of economic success. Future research should try to
come up with a convincing story regarding what’s the mechanism behind the causal
effect that is being uncovered.
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